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THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S
RANDOM BAG SEARCH POLICY: WITHSTANDING
FOURTH AMENDMENT SCRUTINY IS ONLY THE
FIRST STEP IN COMBATING TERRORISM
Eugene Kim∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

September 11, 2001 (9/11) will be remembered as a turning
point in American history. When the terrorist attacks occurred, the
United States had been enjoying a significant period of overall national prosperity and relative peace on the home front.1 9/11 signified that global terrorism would be taken to new extremes and that
nobody was safe.2 At the same time, challenges and doubts from both
home and abroad shed light on a problem just as important as the
problem of preventing terrorists from carrying out their sinister
plans.3 How much of our individual liberties, as Americans, could we
sacrifice for the sake of national security before we gave up precisely
those rights that make us American? This is the issue that courts face
when forced to determine the legality of anti-terrorism measures such
as the random search policy of the New York City Police Department
(“NYPD”) in city subways.4 While the basic desire for survival dictates
that national security measures be taken to protect our very existence,
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William E. Gibson & Rafael Lorente, ‘A Remarkable Resilience’ From Recession and
Shark Attacks to a Rebirth of American Spirit, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec.
30, 2001, at 6.
2
See Editorial, Finish the Job, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 11, 2002, at 8A.
3
See Editorial, Don’t Sacrifice Civil Liberties, OREGONIAN, Nov. 3, 2001, at E4.
4
See Kit R. Roane et al., Drawing a Line in the Subway. (New York Civil Liberties Union Sues the City of New York Over Random Subway Passenger Searches), U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 2005, at 26.
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we must never forget that our existence derives much of its meaning
from certain rights and freedoms.
This Comment addresses the constitutionality of the NYPD’s
random search policy under the Fourth Amendment’s search and
5
seizure clause and possible legal initiatives that can make this antiterrorism measure, and others, more effective. Part I provides the
context in which the controversy surrounding the search policy is to
be understood. Part II undertakes a constitutional analysis of the
6
search policy under the Fourth Amendment, including a review of
the decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.7 Part III examines the weaknesses of the current
search policy, even assuming the policy is constitutional. Part IV considers possible modifications to the policy and broader governmental
and societal changes that would allow for a more effective fight
against terrorism.
II. BACKGROUND
A. 9/11 Terrorist Attacks
On the morning of 9/11, under a clear, blue, sunny sky, thousands of men and women made their way to the World Trade Center
to report for work, as they would on any Tuesday morning. Little did
they realize that they would be witness to the cold, calculated mass
murder of thousands of innocent people that fateful day. At 8:45
a.m., American Airlines Flight 11, a hijacked passenger airplane carrying ninety-two people from Boston to Los Angeles, smashed into
One World Trade Center, exploding on impact and leaving behind a
trail of smoke and fire where there was once office space.8 Less than
twenty minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175, another hijacked
passenger airplane—this one carrying sixty-five people from Boston
to Los Angeles—followed suit, crashing into Two World Trade Cen5

The search and seizure clause is part of the Fourth Amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (search and seizure clause in italics).
6
Id.
7
MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 WL 3338573 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter MacWade I].
8
Paul Moses, Terrorist Attacks/A Day of Infamy/Hijacked Planes Hit WTC and Pentagon, NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 12, 2001, at W02.
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ter. On the streets, onlookers watched in horror as people jumped
out of the buildings to their deaths in an effort to avoid the unbearable flames above.10 Officially, the death toll from the destruction of
the World Trade Center was 2749, including tenants and visitors of
the towers, rescue personnel, airplane crew and passengers, and indi11
viduals on the street and in adjacent buildings. Combined with two
related and deadly incidents on that same day, a hijacked airplane
crash into the Pentagon and a foiled terrorist attack, which resulted
in the crash of a hijacked airplane into an open Pennsylvania field,
the events of 9/11 told Americans they were no longer safe.12
The United States responded quickly and decisively to the terrorist attacks. President George W. Bush created the Office of Homeland Security and officially initiated a war against global terrorism,13
preparing the way for military action in Afghanistan and Iraq.14 Both
houses of Congress, within days of 9/11, approved a forty billion dollar emergency aid package to help victims of the attacks and to help
bring those responsible for the attacks to justice.15 Six-and-a-half
weeks after 9/11, the President signed into law the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act),16
a measure designed to give the government broader powers in fight-

9

Id.
Id.
11
Eric Lipton, Study Maps the Location of Deaths in the Twin Towers, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 2004, at B3.
12
Moses, supra note 8. At 9:43 a.m., hijackers, holding knives and box-cutters,
crashed American Airlines Flight 77, which carried more than fifty passengers and
pilots, into the Pentagon. David Whitman, Day of Infamy: A Timeline of Terror (September 11, 2001), U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 14, 2001, at 18. Within an hour, all federal buildings, including the White House, Congress, the Justice Department, the
State Department, and the Supreme Court, were evacuated. Id. At 10:10 a.m.,
United Airlines Flight 93, commandeered by hijackers and carrying forty-five passengers, crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, about eighty miles southeast of Pittsburgh. Id. The plane was believed to be heading towards the U.S. Capitol, the White
House, or Camp David. Id.
13
George Bush, President of the United States, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (September 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
14
See Mark Thompson & Michael Duffy, Is the Army Stretched Too Thin?, TIME,
Sept. 1, 2003, at 36.
15
Senate Vote Lets Bush Wage War; $40 Bil to Rebuild and Fight Back, INVESTOR'S BUS.
DAILY, Sept. 17, 2001, at A01.
16
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of the
United States Code).
10
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ing terror at home. Key provisions of the original USA PATRIOT
Act included the following: the ease with which the federal government could conduct electronic surveillance, including roving wire18
19
taps; the FBI’s access to certain private records; the ability to detain
immigrants suspected of terrorism for up to a week without being
20
charged with a crime; and the requirement that banks find the
sources of money in certain large private accounts.21 Sixteen of the
more contentious22 sections of the USA PATRIOT Act, including the
roving wiretap and FBI access provisions mentioned above, were
scheduled to expire at the end of 2005.23 On March 8, 2006, Presi24
dent Bush signed the renewal of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Though the country witnessed a rare display of unity in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, as evidenced by the outpouring of grief
and determination to overcome the trauma of that day, tension
quickly began to mount in response to some of the government’s
anti-terror measures. Throughout the nation, there emerged a debate regarding the appropriate balance between protecting civil liberties and protecting national security.25 News and print media
openly questioned and criticized the government’s anti-terror policies as going too far in curtailing civil liberties.26 Organizations such
as the American Civil Liberties Union denounced the fight against
terrorism as a war against immigrants, especially pointing out the
mass detention of hundreds of immigrants, some of whom were
17

Ann McFeatters, Bush Signs Anti-Terror Bill, Says Tough Law Will Preserve Constitutional Rights, PITTSBURGH POST–GAZETTE, October 27, 2001, at A6.
18
50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
19
50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. II 2002).
20
8 U.S.C. § 1226a (Supp. II 2002).
21
31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(3)–(4) (Supp. II 2002); McFeatters, supra note 17, at A6.
22
Editorial, Patriot Act Renewal, BALT. SUN, Oct. 5, 2005, at 12A.
23
18 U.S.C. § 2510 Note (Supp. II 2002) (Termination Date of 2001 Amendment).
24
Bush Celebrates a Victory, Though Not an Easy One, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at
A16. The renewed Act contained several changes as compared to the original.
Charles Babington, Congress Votes to Renew Patriot Act, With Changes, WASH. POST, Mar.
8, 2006, at A3. Libraries functioning in their traditional capacities are no longer subject to “National Security Letters,” which are subpoenas for financial and electronic
records without a judge’s approval. Id. Recipients of subpoenas granted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court have the right to challenge the subpoena’s
gag order requirements. Id. While most of the original provisions become permanent, the roving wiretap provision and the government access to business records
provision are again set to expire in four years. Id.
25
See Elizabeth Bell, Real-Life Lessons Contra Costa and Tri-Valley Teachers Try to Tie
Sept. 11 to Everyday Class Work, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 2002, at 1.
26
See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Fierce Watchdog of the Constitution, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Aug.
12, 2003, at 24.
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abused in prison. At its core, the argument espoused by advocates
of protecting civil liberties is that surrendering individual rights in
the name of increasing national security would entail giving up what
28
it means to be an American.
B. Terrorist Attacks in London
With the United States making a strong recovery after 9/11, the
national mood quickly shifted from tense, patriotic fervor into a
growing sense of complacency. Although Americans regularly dealt
with heightened terror alerts and news of terrorism in foreign countries, with each passing day when no 9/11-type events occurred locally, the feeling that the country was shielded from attacks was beginning to creep back into the national psyche, even if only in the
29
farthest reaches of America’s consciousness. Such was the psychological state of the American people when they learned of the London terrorist attacks during the summer of 2005.30
During the morning rush hour of July 7, 2005, a series of bombs
exploded throughout London’s public transportation system, specifically three subway trains and a bus, killing at least thirty-seven people
and injuring hundreds more.31 The attacks were the deadliest on the
city since bombings by German airplanes during World War II32 and
were eerily reminiscent of the 9/11 attacks, although not in terms of
sheer magnitude. Immediately, British Prime Minister Tony Blair
blamed Islamic extremists, stating that they planned the attacks to coincide with the opening of the G-8 summit in Scotland, a gathering of
leaders from eight of the world’s most economically powerful nations.33
27

Thomas Powers, Liberty and Justice for Almost All, THE WKLY. STANDARD, June 16,
2003, at 12.
28
See Hentoff, supra note 26, at 24.
29
See Evan Thomas & Stryker McGuire, Terror At Rush Hour, NEWSWEEK, July 18,
2005, at 24.
30
See id.
31
Robert Barr, Terrorists Blast London 37 Dead, More than 700 Injured in Four Early
Morning Bombings, BURLINGTON COUNTY TIMES, July 8, 2005, at 1.
32
Id.
33
Id. Member nations include the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany,
the United States of America, Japan, Italy, and Canada. G8 Gleneagles 2005 G8
Background
and
History,
http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=
OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1078995911932 (last visited Nov. 4,
2006). The G8 Summit is a gathering of the leaders of the member nations for the
purpose of discussing major current issues and reaching informal agreements to
reach their goals effectively. G8 Gleneagles 2005 What is the G8 Summit?,
http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage
&c=Page&cid=1078995913300 (last visited Nov. 4, 2006).
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In the United States, the London bombings served to remind
Americans that the battle with terrorism was still very close to home.
The Office of Homeland Security raised the threat level to orange, or
34
high-risk for mass transportation, added police officers, and increased video surveillance, as well as inspections of trash bins and
35
other potential hiding places for bombs. Major cities across the
country added their own security measures.36 With these additional
security measures, the London bombings triggered renewed fears in
America that another 9/11 could happen at any moment.
As London was recovering from the deadly bombings, just two
weeks later on July 21, 2005, another series of blasts went off, again
targeting three subway trains and a bus.37 This time, however, the
bombs caused no injuries, apparently because they failed to explode
properly.38 Speculation regarding potential suspects naturally focused on terrorists, with eyewitnesses reporting men on the subways
39
and on the bus fiddling with knapsacks. If the message was not clear
before, it was now, as both the Americans and the British—as well as
the rest of the modern world—understood that no place was off limits to terrorists.
C. The New York City Police Department’s Random Bag Search Policy
In response to the latest series of bombings in London, the city
of New York, with other large cities paying close attention, took un34

The Homeland Security Advisory System provides warnings in the form of a set
of color-coded, graduated “Threat Conditions,” which correspond to varying levels of
terrorist threats. Homeland Security Presidential Directive–3, http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).
There are five Threat Conditions: low (green), guarded (blue), elevated (yellow),
high (orange), and severe (red). Id. The assignment of each Threat Condition triggers the implementation of appropriate “Protective Measures.” Id. Under a high
Threat Condition, federal departments and agencies should consider coordinating
security efforts with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; taking precautions at public events, including cancellation; preparing to execute contingency procedures; and restricting access to threatened facilities. Id.
35
Sara Kehaulani Goo & Dan Eggen, U.S. Increases Threat Level for Mass Transit,
But Chertoff Says There Is No Sign of Imminent Attack, THE WASH. POST, July 8, 2005 at
A18.
36
Id. In New York, city officials placed police officers in every train during the
morning commute and increased the number of police assigned to the transit system
to 6000, about twice the normal amount Id. In Boston, subway system messages
urged passengers to report suspicious activities, and in Chicago, city police used
bomb-sniffing dogs to patrol the El. Id.
37
Letta Tayler, London Blasts a Sober Reminder, ALBANY TIMES UNION, July 22, 2005,
at A1.
38
Id.
39
Id.
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precedented action by implementing a broad, city-wide random bag
search policy in its subways.40 According to the NYPD, subway passengers are selected randomly but regularly.41 Police Commissioner
Raymond Kelly stressed that search selections would not be based on
race, ethnicity, or religion, with supervisors checking to make sure
42
that the guidelines are being followed. The searches generally take
place before passengers pass through the turnstiles, but the police reserve the right to conduct searches inside the subway system as well.43
Passengers who are asked to be searched may refuse the search, but
they then have to leave the subway station.44 The city provides advance notice about the searches, indicating beforehand at which sta45
tions the searches will take place. The searches, which focus on
backpacks and containers large enough to hold explosives, ideally
discourage subway riders from carrying backpacks and large bags in
the subway system.46
On August 4, 2005, the New York Civil Liberties Union
(“NYCLU”), on behalf of five individual plaintiffs who are patrons of
the New York subways, filed a lawsuit47 in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York against Police Commissioner Kelly and the City of New York, seeking a declaratory judgment that the random search policy is unconstitutional and an injunction against further enforcement of the policy.48 The NYCLU’s
complaint alleged that the search policy is a violation of the Fourth49
and Fourteenth50 Amendments to the United States Constitution and
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.51 The problem, according to the NYCLU, lied in
how the city configured the operations of the search policy.52 In support of its lawsuit, the NYCLU raised a number of points.53

40

Sewell Chan & Kareem Fahim, New York Starts to Inspect Bags on the Subways, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A1.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See id.
46
See Chan & Fahim, supra note 40, at A1.
47
Complaint, MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 WL 1943185 (S.D.N.Y
Aug. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Complaint].
48
Id. at 3–4.
49
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
51
Complaint, supra note 47, at 11.
52
See id. at 1–8.
53
Id.
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First, the NYCLU asserted that the search policy is not likely to
catch or deter terrorists because advance notice of searching is given,
passengers selected for searches are free to walk away, and searches
are conducted at a small proportion of the city’s subway entrances at
any given time.54 Second, the NYCLU argued that the only people be55
ing searched are innocent passengers. The complaint points out
that millions of people depend on the subway system and that many
of these people carry bags, briefcases, and other such items in which
56
they have an expectation of privacy. Third, the NYCLU contended
that the search policy was not a response to any specific threat against
57
the city. Fourth, the NYCLU claimed that the NYPD may search a
passenger without having any suspicion that the passenger has engaged in or will engage in any wrongdoing.58 Furthermore, the
NYCLU believes the search policy creates the potential for impermissible racial profiling.59 Since there is such a high volume of subway
users, it is not realistic to expect that the NYPD will be able to adhere
to a truly random search formula, such as one in every five passengers.60 Rather, it is more likely that police will arbitrarily select passengers for searches, opening the door for racial profiling.61 Finally,
the NYCLU suspects that police may be able to arrest a person after a
search reveals that he or she has committed a crime.62 This may be
problematic because searches and seizures by government actors are
ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion.63
Evidence obtained by unreasonable, and thus invalid, searches is
prohibited from use in both federal64 and state65 courts.
On December 2, 2005, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, in MacWade v. Kelly,66 issued its decision on the constitutionality of the NYPD’s search policy. Judge
Berman’s opinion held that the search policy is constitutional.67 On
54

Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
56
Id. at 4–5.
57
Complaint, supra note 47, at 5.
58
Id. at 6.
59
Id. at 7.
60
See id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 8.
63
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997). An exception to this general rule
is the “special needs” doctrine. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
64
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
65
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
66
MacWade I, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 WL 3338573 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005).
67
Id. at *1.
55
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December 19, 2005, the NYCLU appealed the Southern District’s ruling.68
III.

ANALYSIS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S
SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAUSE

A. Introduction to the Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure
Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un69
reasonable searches and seizures.” The American colonists drafted
the Fourth Amendment as a check against governmental intrusions
into the peoples’ privacy, after years of unlimited intrusions by the
British government.70 As the Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized, the “central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by
government officials.”71
For the search and seizure clause to apply, the following elements must exist: 1) governmental action,72 and 2) conduct that constitutes either a search73 or a seizure.74 A search, for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, is understood to mean a governmental invasion
of a person’s privacy.75 However, not every invasion of privacy will
constitute a search because only those invasions that intrude upon
certain expectations of privacy will qualify for protection.76 The test
68

NYCLU appeals ruling on subway searches, http://www.nyclu.org/
mta_searches_suit_pr_121905.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2007). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the southern district’s decision.
MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 275 (2nd Cir. 2006) [hereinafter MacWade II].
69
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment also provides for the proper
issue of warrants, which must be based on probable cause. Id. However, obtaining a
warrant is not a prerequisite for a reasonable search or seizure. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 (1968). It is permissible to search or seize without a warrant or probable
cause when doing so would be reasonable based on the circumstances. Id. at 20–22.
For example, the quick decisions and actions of police officers on the beat are generally not subject to the warrant procedure. Id. at 20.
70
Denise Robinson, Supreme Court Review, Kaupp v. Texas: Breathing Life Into The
Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762 (2004) (citing Alan C. Yarcusko, Note, Brown to Payton to Harris: A Fourth Amendment Double Play by the Supreme
Court, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 253, 257–58 (1992)).
71
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975).
72
See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980).
73
See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
74
See, e.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572–73 (1988).
75
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177–78.
76
Id. at 177.
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for determining whether a privacy expectation is legitimate asks
whether an individual has an actual subjective expectation of privacy
and, then, whether that expectation is reasonable from society’s ob77
jective viewpoint. For example, curbside garbage does not receive
Fourth Amendment protection because “[i]t is common knowledge
that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public,” and therefore, there is no reasonable expec78
tation of privacy in those items.
A seizure, under the Fourth
Amendment, occurs “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
79
he was not free to leave.” Circumstances indicating a potential seizure include “the threatening presence of several officers, the display
of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of
the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.”80 In California v. Hodari D.,81 the Supreme Court of the United States clarified
the definition of a seizure. Justice Scalia explained that the condition
of a reasonable person believing that he was not free to leave is necessary, but not sufficient, to satisfy the test for a seizure.82 In narrowing the scope of a seizure, the Court held that, with respect to a show
of authority (as opposed to an application of physical force), there is
no seizure if the subject does not yield.83
B. Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures
1.

General Factors to Consider

Although there are several factors that should be considered in
determining whether a given search or seizure is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, the single most important factor may be the
balance between privacy rights and governmental interests. The Supreme Court of the United States has explained that “reasonableness
. . . depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by
77

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
79
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
80
Id.
81
499 U.S. 621 (1991).
82
Id. at 628.
83
Id. at 626. Some states have rejected Hodari D. under their state constitutions.
See, e.g., In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 780 (Minn. 1993); People v. Bora,
634 N.E.2d 168, 169–70 (N.Y. 1994).
78
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[the government].” Under the Supreme Court’s test, a search or
seizure is reasonable if the government’s need for the search or seizure outweighs the privacy interest in the intrusion upon the individ85
ual. In undertaking this balancing analysis, courts “must consider
the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is
conducted.”86 The balancing analysis is not one that can be applied
mechanically; rather, the test must be applied on a case-by-case ba87
sis.
A determination of reasonableness requires a court to consider
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure in
question.88 The Supreme Court, for the most part, has avoided using
per se rules in the context of Fourth Amendment analysis.89 In United
States v. Drayton,90 the Court considered whether police officers violated the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights by boarding a bus to
91
ask questions and conduct searches. In Drayton, three plainclothes
police officers conducted a routine drug and weapons check of a
Greyhound bus at a refueling stop.92 One of the officers walked down
the bus aisle asking individual passengers about their plans and attempting to match passengers with their luggage in the overhead
racks.93 Passengers were free to leave the bus without argument at
any time.94 During the course of this search, one of the officers asked
the two defendants for permission to check their persons and both
defendants consented.95 The defendants were arrested when the
searches revealed that they were concealing drugs.96 The Court reasoned that, even though the searching officer did not expressly inform passengers of their right to refuse searches, the officer did ask
for permission to check bags and persons, indicating to a reasonable

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
Id.
See id.
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002).
Id.
536 U.S. 194 (2002).
Id. at 197–200.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 199.
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199.
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person that he or she was free to refuse. Thus, finding that consent
was voluntary, the Court held that the searches were reasonable.98
In contrast to the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the Supreme Court has also warned that undertaking case-by-case analyses
of governmental need could open the door to litigation every time a
99
dispute arises in the Fourth Amendment context. In Atwater v. City
100
of Lago Vista, the petitioner was arrested for a seatbelt violation pursuant to a state law that authorized warrantless arrests for seatbelt vio101
lations.
The Court rejected as impractical the petitioner’s arguments that the validity of warrantless arrests should hinge on
distinctions between major and minor crimes.102 In the Court’s opinion, the key is to create “standards sufficiently clear and simple to be
applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing
months and years after an arrest or search is made.”103 The Court explained that a balancing-test analysis of a particular situation is unnecessary when probable cause exists.104 Accordingly, the Court held
that “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual
has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he
may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”105 As a prerequisite to individualized judicial review of a
Fourth Amendment claim, the defendant must overcome the preference for categorical treatment of such claims by “mak[ing] a colorable argument that an arrest, with or without a warrant, was ‘conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to [his]
privacy or even physical interests.’”106 Thus, the Court seems to reveal
a preference for administrative convenience and practicality.
In determining reasonableness, the courts distinguish between
individualized searches and generalized schemes.107 The general rule
is that a search or seizure is unreasonable if there is no suspicion
against specific individuals.108 However, an exception may be made
97

Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
99
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
100
532 U.S. 318 (2001).
101
Id. at 323–24.
102
Id. at 347–50.
103
Id. at 347.
104
Id. at 354.
105
Id.
106
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352–53 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818
(1996) (second alteration in original)).
107
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37–40 (2000).
108
Id. at 37.
98
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for “intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized suspicion.”109 For example, a highway checkpoint normally does not serve to stop individuals based on any specific suspicion; but programmatic purposes, such as keeping the roads free of
drunk drivers, may make the checkpoint constitutional.110 In United
111
States v. Davis, a case involving an airport screening procedure, the
Supreme Court explained that “searches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose,
rather than as part of a criminal investigation . . . may be permissible
under the Fourth Amendment though not supported by a showing of
112
probable cause.”
The Court may also utilize the “special needs” doctrine to justify
searches that are conducted in the absence of individualized suspicion.113 The court explained the doctrine by stating that “in the context of safety and administrative regulations, a search unsupported by
probable cause may be reasonable ‘when special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probablecause requirement impracticable.’”114 For example, in Board of Education v. Earls,115 the Court found that a special need existed in a public
school district’s policy of drug testing students involved in extracurricular activities because the state is responsible for maintaining their
discipline, health, and safety.116
Consent is another factor that may be considered in determining reasonableness.117 If an individual consents to a search or seizure,
there is no need to address the question of reasonableness because
the search or seizure is valid by virtue of the individual’s consent.118
In order for valid consent to exist, the government does not necessarily have to establish that the individual subject to search or seizure
had express notice or knowledge of the right to refuse consent.119
Valid consent can be established by showing, based upon a totality of
the circumstances, that individuals could reasonably infer from the
109

Id. at 45–46.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
111
482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
112
Id. at 908.
113
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)).
114
Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
115
536 U.S. 822 (2002).
116
See id. at 829–32.
117
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2002).
118
See id. at 206.
119
Id. at 206–07.
110
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120

situation that they were free to refuse consent. In Drayton—where
the defendants gave express verbal consent for their bags and persons
to be searched121—the police officers did not brandish any weapons,
did not make any intimidating movements, left the aisle free for passengers to exit, and spoke to passengers individually in a polite
122
voice. Based on these facts, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
defendants’ consent was not coerced.123 The Court also supported
the proposition that law enforcement officials may ask for consent to
search, even when there is no apparent reason to be suspicious, if cooperation is not coerced.124 Furthermore, the Court explained that a
seizure does not occur where “a reasonable person would feel free to
125
terminate the encounter.”
Another relevant factor with respect to reasonableness is the
scope of a search or seizure.126 To determine whether the scope of
the intrusion was within the standards of reasonableness, courts ask
whether the search or seizure “was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”127 In
the oft-cited case of Terry v. Ohio,128 the Supreme Court considered
whether a police officer’s pat-down search and subsequent seizure of
concealed weapons from individuals he deemed to have been acting
suspiciously on the street were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.129 The Court, analyzing the scope of the search and seizure,
applied an objective test: whether a man of reasonable caution would
believe the officer’s actions were appropriate, given the facts available
to the officer at that moment.130 Applying this standard, the Court
concluded that the officer’s patting down of the individuals’ outer
clothing was reasonable in scope in light of his justifiable belief,
based on observable actions, that the men were armed.131 In later
120

Id.
Id. at 198–99.
122
Id. at 203–04.
123
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204.
124
Id. at 200–01.
125
Id. at 201.
126
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
127
Id. at 20.
128
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
129
Id. at 4–8.
130
Id. at 21–22.
131
Id. at 27–30. Where two men were hanging out at a street corner, apparently
not waiting for anyone or anything, and alternately walking up and down a street to
peer into a store window about twenty-four times, it was reasonable for the officer to
think that the individuals were planning a robbery and were thus armed. Id. at 22–
23, 28. The scope of the officer’s search was reasonable because it was justified by
121
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cases, the Court also explained that the scope of a search is generally
defined by the nature of the object sought and the places in which
there is probable cause to believe it may be found.132
One final point regarding the reasonableness of searches and
133
seizures is the applicability of the plain view doctrine, which justifies
a police officer’s warrantless seizure of an article of evidence in his
plain view, if “the initial intrusion that [brought] the police within
plain view of such . . . article is supported . . . by one of the recog134
nized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” The plain view doctrine is also applicable when a police officer “is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object.”135 The doctrine should be understood “as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer’s ‘access to an object’ may be.”136
2.

Examples of Legitimate Governmental Interests that
Justify Suspicionless Searches and Seizures

Generally, a governmental interest is legitimate if it is concerned
with the public’s safety and welfare. For example, highway safety is a
valid governmental interest that arises in the context of searches and
seizures occurring during highway checkpoint stops.137 In Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz,138 the Supreme Court considered
whether seizures in the form of state sobriety checkpoints were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.139 Holding that the checkpoints were constitutional, the Supreme Court used a three-pronged
test that balanced the governmental interest, the extent to which the
checkpoint advanced that interest, and the individual privacy inter-

the desire to protect himself and others nearby. Id. at 29. In addition to limiting his
search to a pat-down of the outer garments, the officer did not place his hands in the
pockets or under the surface of the outer garments until he felt weapons. Terry, 392
U.S. at 29–30.
132
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (holding that permission to search
car for narcotics included authority to search containers within the car); United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824–25 (1982) (holding that authorization to search car
for contraband allowed officer to search every part of the vehicle and its contents).
133
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (“It is well established
that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without
a warrant.”).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 466.
136
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983).
137
See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449 (1990).
138
496 U.S. 444 (1990).
139
Id. at 447.
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140

est. The Court found that the prevention of drunken driving was a
legitimate governmental interest,141 that sobriety checkpoints effectively advanced that interest (1.5% arrest rate for one of the check142
points in question), and that intrusion into individual privacy was
minimal (stops were brief and caused a minimal amount of fear and
143
144
surprise in law abiding motorists).
In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court provided an example of a constitutionally invalid highway seizure.145 The seizure in Prouse consisted of stopping a car on a
public highway to check a driver’s license and vehicle registration,
where there was no reason to believe the driver was violating any
146
laws.
Justice White supported the Court’s decision by explaining
that “[t]he marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting
from a system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant
of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure—limited in magnitude
compared to other intrusions but nonetheless constitutionally cognizable—at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials.”147
The Court left open the possibility, however, that states could develop
constitutional methods for spot checks “that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion[,]” such as “[q]uestioning of all
oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops.”148
The prevention of illegal immigration is another valid governmental interest in the context of Fourth Amendment searches and
seizures. For example, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,149 the Supreme Court held that fixed border patrol checkpoints—where the
occupants of stopped vehicles are briefly detained for questioning,
even though there is no reason to suspect that such vehicles would
harbor illegal aliens—are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.150 The Court further held that such fixed checkpoints did not
require prior authorization by judicial warrants.151 The Court also accepted giving a wide degree of discretion to Border Patrol officers

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id. at 448–49, 455 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979)).
Id. at 451.
Id. at 453–55.
Id. at 451–53.
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
Id. at 663.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 663.
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Id. at 545.
Id.
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with respect to the individuals selected for questioning, even if selections are based on apparent Mexican ancestry.152
Although roadway checkpoints set up to promote highway safety
and to prevent illegal immigration are constitutional, checkpoints
153
may not be operated as a general crime control measure. In City of
154
Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court held that the city’s
checkpoint program violated the Fourth Amendment “[b]ecause the
primary purpose . . . [was] ultimately indistinguishable from the gen155
eral interest in crime control. . . .” The city’s checkpoint program
conducted roadblocks for the purpose of intercepting the transportation of illegal drugs.156 Although the program was relatively successful,157 the relevant issue for the Court was the reasonableness of the
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.158 The Court refused to dispense with the general rule that individualized suspicion be present
for seizures, stating that “[the court] cannot sanction stops justified
only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation
and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed
some crime.”159 In considering the reasonableness of suspicionless
checkpoints operated pursuant to a general scheme of law enforcement, purpose becomes a relevant issue, and in Edmond, the court
found that drug interdiction falls under the impermissible category
of general crime control.160
Crime control may be a permissible aim, however, if the checkpoint is designed to apprehend individuals connected to very specific
and known crimes.161 In Illinois v. Lidster,162 the Supreme Court held
that a highway checkpoint stop organized for the purpose of investigating a recent fatal crime was constitutional.163 The court applied
the three-pronged balancing test164 enunciated in Brown v. Texas:165 1)
the seizure advanced a grave public concern (finding the perpetrator
152

Id. at 563–64.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000).
154
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
155
Id. at 48.
156
Id. at 34–35.
157
See id. The arrest rate at the checkpoints was approximately nine percent. Id.
158
Id. at 37.
159
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
160
Id.
161
See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004).
162
540 U.S. 419 (2004).
163
Id. at 427–28.
164
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (citing
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979)); see supra text accompanying note 140.
165
443 U.S. 47 (1979).
153
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of a specific crime); 2) the seizure significantly advanced this grave
public concern (police were able to obtain information from drivers,
some of whom may have seen something relevant); and 3) the intrusion into personal liberty rights was very minimal (individuals waited
a few minutes in line and had a few seconds of contact with the po166
lice).
Thus, the balancing analysis weighed in favor of a finding
that the checkpoint stop in Lidster was reasonable and, therefore, constitutional.167
An interesting area of Fourth Amendment law, due to the exigencies of modern society, is found in the realm of airport security.
In United States v. Marquez,168 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that random airport searches that subject passengers to handheld magnetometer wand scans are constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment.169 Airport screening searches are not
considered crime control searches, but rather administrative searches
designed to deter passengers from carrying weapons or explosives
and to stop them if they actually do carry weapons or explosives.170
The test for reasonableness of airport screening searches considers
whether: 1) the search is “‘no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives;
2) it is confined in good faith to that purpose; and 3) passengers may
avoid the search by electing not to fly.’”171 In Marquez, the Ninth Circuit, as other courts have done,172 found that random metal detector
scans of persons are reasonably necessary and not overly intrusive
given the interests at stake.173 The court reasoned that “the randomness of the selection for the additional screening procedure arguably
increases the deterrent effects of airport screening procedures because potential passengers may be influenced by their knowledge that
they may be subject to random, more thorough screening procedures.”174 The court also added that the validity of airport screening

166

Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427–28.
Id.
168
410 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2005).
169
Id. at 614.
170
Id. at 616–17.
171
Id. at 616 (quoting Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., 298 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
172
E.g., United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109–10 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Routine security searches at airport checkpoints pass constitutional muster because the compelling public interest in curbing air piracy generally outweighs their limited intrusiveness.”).
173
Marquez, 410 F.3d at 617.
174
Id.
167
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searches depends upon the recognition of an individual’s right not to
be searched—by not boarding the plane.175
Although the Supreme Court has never decided a case involving
a search or seizure program designed primarily as an anti-terrorism
measure, presumably, combating and deterring terrorist attacks—
since such interests fall under the broader category of public safety
and welfare—is a legitimate governmental interest. Notably, in Edmond, Justice O’Connor wrote in dicta that “an appropriately tailored
roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack” would be
176
valid under the Fourth Amendment.
C. Constitutional Analysis of the NYPD’s Search Policy Under the
Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment
Initially, a court must address whether the NYPD’s random bag
checks constitute searches and/or seizures within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. Since subway passengers are free to walk away
from bag checks and are given advance notice of checks, thus avoiding the possibility of being checked, it seems that these bag checks do
not constitute seizures.177 With respect to the question of whether
these checks are searches, however, the answer is clearly yes. Since
the bag checks of subway passengers are handled by NYPD officers
and are authorized by the city, the government action requirement is
satisfied,178 and since the bag checks are governmental invasions of
individual privacy, they constitute searches.179
A more difficult question is whether subway passengers have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in their belongings so that the bag
checks fall within the reach of the Fourth Amendment.180 There is little doubt that passengers—at least some of them—have individual
subjective expectations of privacy, as evidenced by the NYCLU’s lawsuit on behalf of five individual subway riders.181 It is also easy to understand that this expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable

175

Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1973)).
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
177
See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002); supra note 125 and accompanying text.
178
See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); supra note 72 and accompanying text.
179
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177–78 (1984); supra note 75 and accompanying text.
180
See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177; supra note 76 and accompanying text.
181
Complaint, supra note 47, at 8–11. Plaintiffs were offended by the search and
felt that it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
176

KIMFINAL

580

1/12/2007 11:20:06 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:561

182

from society’s standpoint. Often, the reason that people keep personal belongings and items in bags, briefcases, purses, and backpacks
is precisely because those items are private in nature. It is reasonable
to expect that such privacy will be maintained while traveling in public places. Therefore, since the NYPD’s random bag checks clearly
constitute searches, they fall within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure clause.
The next phase of the Fourth Amendment analysis is to balance
the governmental interest with the individual privacy interests and
determine whether the random search policy advances the government’s interest.183 Here, the governmental interest is a public safety
concern, preventing and deterring terrorism. This is certainly a legitimate and very serious governmental interest since millions of human lives, as well as tremendous amounts of personal and public
property, are at stake. In comparison, the burden on the individual
privacy interest is minimal. Subway passengers selected for searches
will ordinarily have to sacrifice a few seconds of their time and a couple minutes at the most. This is reasonable in light of the fact that
the searches are supposed to prevent the very serious threat of terrorism. 184 Presumably, the manner in which the searches are conducted
is also reasonable.185 This is not a case of overly hostile police officers
subjecting passengers to outright humiliation by conducting strip
searches, which are ordinarily unreasonable absent special circumstances,186 or even pat-down searches.187 Rather, the police officers
look briefly into selected bags and then allow the passengers to move
on.188 Even if the intrusion into privacy was more than minimally
burdensome, however, some courts would still find in favor of reasonableness. In United States v. Bell,189 a Second Circuit case involving
182

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); supra note 77 and accompanying text.
183
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (citing Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979)); supra note 140 and accompanying text.
184
See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004) (upholding the validity
of a highway checkpoint designed to apprehend perpetrators of a specific crime
where stops were for a few minutes at most); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 546–47 (1976) (upholding the validity of fixed border patrol checkpoints
where average length of stop is three to five minutes).
185
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); supra note 127 and accompanying text.
186
See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 495 A.2d 910, 914 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
187
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 4–8; supra note 129 and accompanying text.
188
Tom Hays, NYPD Implements Random Bag Search on City’s Subways, July 22, 2005,
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/online/The-Latest/NYPD-Implements-RandomBag-Search-on-Citys-Subways/4946SIW306.
189
464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
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an airport search, Chief Judge Friendly, in a concurring opinion, expressed his belief that:
[w]hen the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing
up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the
purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his
liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to
190
travel by air.

The balance between the governmental interest in preventing
terrorism and the individual privacy interest weighs in favor of the
governmental interest. However, the more difficult issue is whether
the NYPD’s random search policy meaningfully advances that gov191
ernmental interest.
The trouble with this issue is that there is no
way to know for sure that the search policy is working, even if it is
successful. To illustrate, suppose that, back in June 2005, a terrorist
was planning to execute a suicide-bombing mission in the subway system. After the city announces its random search policy for the subways, the terrorist abandons his plans. This is an example where the
search policy met its goal of deterring terrorism, but there is no way
for an outsider to know about this success unless he personally knew
the terrorist. Even if one could know about such accounts of deterrence realized, it is not clear at what rate such realizations would have
to occur to qualify the search policy as worthwhile. Arrest rates may
be relevant in this analysis. For example, if one in every 10,000 passengers is caught with explosives, the question is whether that is
enough to proclaim that the governmental interest is being advanced. On the other hand, arrest rates probably are not an accurate
measure of the search policy’s success because such statistics do not
take into account the effect of deterrence. With respect to deterrence, given the nature of the search policy, it is difficult to say
whether the searches indeed deter terrorists. After all, at any given
time, many subway stations are not subject to random searches, and
those that are subject to searches provide advance notice.192
Although there are doubts about the effectiveness of the NYPD’s
search policy, notwithstanding the difficulty in measuring with any
certainty the degree to which random searches advance the city’s in190

Id. at 675 (Friendly, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (citing
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979)); supra note 140 and accompanying text.
192
Complaint, supra note 47, at 1–2.
191
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terest in preventing terrorist attacks, the searches are still reasonable
because the intrusion into privacy rights is so minimal compared to
the risk of terrorism. The prudent course of action in a situation
193
such as this is to adopt Judge Friendly’s approach.
Since the
stakes—potentially millions of human lives—are so high, even if the
search policy deters or prevents only one serious terrorist attack over
a span of several years, the better viewpoint is to suppose as true that
the policy advances the governmental interest. In doing so, a totalityof-the-circumstances approach is taken. Reasonableness is judged by
looking at the big picture, in terms of both time span and space.
Considering that New York City will likely be a prime terrorist target
well into the future, in light of the current geo-political climate in
which Americans live, stopping a percentage of subway riders for
brief bag checks is really not too much to ask.
Two other factors weigh in favor of reasonableness. First, subway
194
passengers have the right to refuse consent to the searches.
If a
passenger is selected for a search and the passenger objects, he or she
is free to simply walk away at the cost of not boarding the subway
train at that particular station.195 Since passengers have knowledge of
the right to refuse consent, if they submit to searches, they will be
presumed to have voluntarily consented to those searches. This is
significant because voluntary consent weighs in favor of a valid
search,196 and seizures of evidence found in the course of a valid
search are reasonable.197 Second, the programmatic purpose of deterring terrorism is relevant here.198 The general rule that individualized suspicion justify each search is inapplicable here because such a
requirement renders a random search policy aimed at stopping terrorism completely unworkable.199 Furthermore, searches undertaken

193

See Bell, 464 F.2d at 675 (Friendly, C.J., concurring); supra note 190 and accompanying text.
194
Chan & Fahim, supra note 40, at A1.
195
Id.
196
See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–08 (2002) (finding that police
officers could proceed with search where there was voluntary consent).
197
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); supra note 134 and accompanying text. Furthermore, seizures of evidence related to non-terrorist crimes,
such as drugs or weapons, will be reasonable pursuant to the plain view doctrine. See
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466; supra note 135 and accompanying text. The NYCLU was
clearly concerned about this issue. See Complaint, supra note 47, at 8; supra note 62
and accompanying text.
198
See Mich. Dep’t. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); supra note 110
and accompanying text.
199
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000); supra note 109
and accompanying text.

KIMFINAL

1/12/2007 11:20:06 AM

COMMENT

2007]

583
200

pursuant to a generalized scheme are permissible.
In fact, the
NYPD’s random search policy is similar to screening procedures implemented at major airports, which are, of course, valid.201 Both procedures seek to prevent and deter terrorism, and both procedures
occur at mass transportation centers open to the public. The major
difference is that subway systems are used for relatively quick intracity commutes, whereas airports are used for flying much greater distances. The nature of air travel and the logistics of airport operations
allow for search procedures that subject all passengers to security
measures. This is not currently possible in the New York City subway
system. Searching every single passenger, though a much more effective deterrent than the current policy, would create a logjam at subway stations and bring the city to a grinding halt. This is why random
searches must suffice.
Considering the various factors at play here—the serious governmental interest in preventing and deterring terrorism, the minimal intrusion on individual privacy rights, the risk that even one act
of terrorism could cost unacceptable numbers of human lives and
economic damage, the fact that individuals have the right to refuse
consent, and the programmatic purpose of the policy—the NYPD’s
random search policy is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
D. MacWade v. Kelly
1.

The District Court’s Decision

After a two-day bench trial held on October 31 and November 1,
2005, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York ruled on December 2, 2005 that the NYPD’s random search
policy202 is constitutional.203 At the outset, Judge Richard M. Berman
noted some important findings of fact.204 First, the New York City
subway system operates twenty-four hours a day and is the largest and
most used subway system in the United States.205 Second, based on
the testimony of city officials, the threat of a terrorist attack in New

200

See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45–46 (2000); supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973); supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
202
The court refers to the random search policy as the “Container Inspection Program.” MacWade I, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005).
203
Id.
204
Id. at *3–*15.
205
Id. at *4.
201
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206

York City’s subways is real and substantial.
Third, the city of New
York implemented the random search policy to “address the threat of
an explosive device being taken into the subway system in a carry-on
207
container, as had occurred in . . . London.” Finally, the court, giving deference to city officials and their expert witnesses, found the
random search policy to be an effective measure for deterring terrorism.208
The court began its constitutional discussion by establishing the
209
“special needs” doctrine as its legal analytical framework.
Judge
Berman explained the essence of the doctrine by asserting that when
“the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and
other official buildings.”210 The judge then enunciated the appropriate standard of analysis under the Fourth Amendment when a special
need exists: “a fact-specific balancing of the intrusion . . . against the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”211
In the first part of the court’s analysis, Judge Berman found that
the NYPD’s random search policy addressed a special need—the
need to decrease the real and substantial public safety risk of a terrorist attack on the subways.212 Citing Edmond, Judge Berman distinguished between a general interest in crime control and the need to
go beyond ordinary law enforcement.213 The judge believed that the
search policy was designed for the special purpose of keeping explosives out of the subway, rather than crime control in general, by

206

Id. According to Michael Sheehan, the NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner for
Counter-Terrorism, transportation systems are attractive targets for terrorists for the
following reasons: 1) potential for high casualties due to high volume of people, 2)
disruption to all or part of transportation system, 3) serious economic consequences,
and 4) public fear and demoralization. Id. The London bombings in July 2005 were
cause for concern regarding New York City’s subways because they were carried out
by members of groups with links to similar groups in New York, and they were carried out notwithstanding a substantial security system. MacWade I, 2005 WL 3338573,
at *4.
207
Id. at *5. The city was also aware of the 2004 Madrid and Moscow bombings in
public transportation systems. Id. at *4–*5.
208
Id. at *11.
209
Id. at *16; see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
210
Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997)).
211
MacWade I, 2005 WL 3338573, at *16 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 830 (2002)).
212
Id. at *17.
213
Id. (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37–38, 47–48); see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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pointing to the facts that passengers had advance notice and could
leave the subway system to avoid searches.214
Next, the court found that the random search policy was a reasonably effective measure for furthering the compelling governmental interest of preventing a terrorist bombing of the New York City
215
subway system. As support for the finding of a compelling governmental interest, Judge Berman emphasized that there is an extremely
serious interest in preserving human life.216 In determining that the
random search policy was a reasonably effective measure of furthering the governmental interest, Judge Berman cautioned that the policy only has to be a reasonable method—not the most effective
method—for preventing terrorism in order to survive constitutional
scrutiny.217 On this point, the court reasoned that the uncertainty
and randomness associated with the selection of searches helped
generate a reasonably effective means of deterring terrorists.218
Finally, the court determined that the random search policy intruded only minimally on the privacy interests of subway passengers.219 Judge Berman pointed out that the Fourth Amendment does
not require that a search be the least intrusive search possible.220
Rather, the key is whether there is a close and substantial relation between the governmental interest and the means employed to further
that interest.221 In finding that the random search policy met this
standard, the court listed four reasons supporting the conclusion that
privacy interests were only minimally invaded.222 First, passengers are
given advance notice of searches.223 Second, searches are conducted
openly so that police officers have limited discretion in selecting passengers for searches except to determine whether a bag is large
enough to carry an explosive.224 Third, passengers selected for
searches have the choice to refuse the search and walk away.225
Fourth, the searches are properly limited in scope and duration be214

MacWade I, 2005 WL 3338573, at *17.
Id. at *17–*18.
216
Id. at *17.
217
Id. (citing Mollica v. Volker, 229 F.3d 366, 370 (2d Cir. 2000)).
218
Id. at *18.
219
Id. at *19.
220
MacWade I, 2005 WL 3338573, at *19 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
837 (2002)).
221
Id. (citing United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 192 (2d Cir. 2004)).
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.
215
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cause officers may look only for bags or containers capable of holding
explosives and may open or manipulate the contents of the bags or
containers only if necessary.226
Balancing the relevant interests, the court held that since the
random search policy reasonably advanced the vitally important governmental interest of preventing terrorism in the subways while only
227
minimally intruding upon privacy, the search policy is valid.
2.

The Second Circuit’s Decision

On August 11, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, agreeing that
the search policy is a reasonable means of addressing a special
need.228 Before undertaking the reasonableness analysis under the
229
special needs doctrine, the court addressed two initial concerns.
First, the court held that the doctrine does not require that an individual subject to a special needs search possess a reduced privacy interest.230 Rather, the individual privacy interest is a factor to be considered in the balancing analysis.231 Second, the court reiterated that
the search policy does indeed serve a special need—that of protecting
the public from a terrorist attack.232
The heart of the court’s opinion came in the balancing of four
factors—governmental interest, individual privacy interest, intrusiveness of the search, and effectiveness of the search—to determine the
reasonableness of the search policy under the Fourth Amendment.233
First, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the government’s interest in preventing terrorism is immediate and substantial.234 Second, the court stated that subway passengers have a full expectation of privacy in their containers.235 Third, the court found the
searches minimally intrusive.236 Finally, the court determined that the
226

MacWade I, 2005 WL 3338573, at *19.
Id. at *20.
228
MacWade II, 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006).
229
Id. at 269–71.
230
Id. at 270.
231
Id.
232
Id. at 271.
233
Id. at 271–75.
234
MacWade II, 460 F.3d at 271–72.
235
Id. at 272–73.
236
Id. at 273. The court listed the following reasons to support its finding: 1) advance notice of searches; 2) limitation of searches to containers capable of hiding
explosives; 3) shortness of searches; 4) openness of the searches, which reduces fear
and stigma associated with searches in hidden areas; and 5) lack of discretion by police in choosing whom to search. Id.
227
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searches were a reasonably effective means of preventing and deterring terrorism, giving considerable deference to the judgment of law
enforcement authorities.237 Balancing these factors, the Second Circuit concluded that the search policy is reasonable, and therefore
constitutional.238
IV.

THE SEARCH POLICY’S WEAKNESSES

A. The Search Policy Is Not Likely to Deter Terrorists
A serious flaw with the NYPD’s random search policy is that it is
unlikely to significantly deter, or even catch, potential terrorists. Accepting the allegations in the NYCLU’s complaint as true, “the NYPD
is not conducting searches at most subway entrances at any given
time,” and advance notice is given at those stations where searches
are being conducted.239 Thus, it is easy to see why the NYCLU would
characterize the random search program as “virtually certain neither
to catch any person trying to carry explosives into the subway system
nor to deter such an effort.”240 If a terrorist wanted to carry out an attack in the subways and approached a subway station that was conducting searches, he could leave based on the advance notice or by
walking away from a search if selected. Then, he would simply have
to find his way to one of the many entrances not being searched at
that time. Furthermore, since police officers supposedly select individuals for searches at regular intervals, such as one in every five,241 a
terrorist could just take his chances at a subway station where
searches were being conducted and still avoid detection. The problem with this is obvious: “[A] terrorist wired up like a human computer might easily stroll into a train car just so long as he hits the interval right. But a grandma from Great Neck or a Wall Street lawyer
from Roslyn could wind up getting the works from the cops.”242 Thus,
the arbitrary nature of the searches and the fact that the searches are
easily avoidable without sacrificing entry into the subway system
means that terrorists are probably not deterred in any significant way.

237

Id. at 273–75.
Id. at 275.
239
Complaint, supra note 47, at 1–2.
240
Id. at 2.
241
Paul Sperry, It's the Age of Terror: What Would You Do?, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2005,
at A25.
242
The Limits of Safety: How Might Random Checks Stop an Intent Suicidal Jihadist?
NEWSDAY (New York), July 30, 2005, at A48.
238
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B. The Net Effect of the Search Policy Is to Inconvenience Subway
Passengers
Since the search policy in and of itself probably does not and will
not deter potential terrorists, the overall effect of the searches is to
inconvenience innocent subway passengers. With the subway system
congested as it is, the searches have the potential to increase overcrowding and make commute times even longer, potentially decreasing worker productivity. At the least, the city may be wasting political
capital on what is viewed by some as a futile policy that will undoubtedly raise the ire of a few subway passengers. Understandably, many
commuters have voiced their displeasure. Troy Dowdy of Yonkers,
New York had this to say about the searches: “This is a way for them
to take away our liberty . . . . Tell everybody to read George Orwell’s
1984 to figure out what’s going on. . . . It gives the illusion that we
are safe.”243 David Brown, visiting in New York, stated that the
searches “created more anxiety and paranoia than safety.”244 Some
subway riders seemed upset more because of the inconvenience factor than the intrusion into privacy rights. Andrew Morris, a New
Yorker, explained how the searches would test the patience of commuters: “Sometimes you need to get to an appointment, you’re running late and a cop stops you to delay you even further? That’s going
to create a mess.”245
C. The Search Policy Results in a Potentially Inefficient Allocation of
Manpower
Another problem with the search policy, not immediately obvious, is the potentially inefficient allocation of law enforcement personnel for conducting random subway searches. Neysa Pranger,
campaign coordinator for the New York Public Interest Research
Group Straphangers’ Campaign, a subway riders’ advocacy group,
states that “the MTA and the NYPD could be doing better things with
their time,” and “[the random searches are] going to do very little to
help deter an attack.”246 Assuming the random subway searches are

243

Ainsley O'Connell & James Fanelli, NYPD Begins Searching Bags of Transit Riders,
NEWSDAY (New York), July 22, 2005, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/
nationworld/world/nyc-secu0722,0,2113455.story.
244
Id.
245
Random Bag Searches Begin at N.Y. Subway, BALTIMORE SUN, July 22, 2005, available at http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/custom/attack/bal-te.newyork22jul22,
1,7820993.story?coll=bal-attack-headlines.
246
Sheryl McCarthy, Let's Search for Other Ways to Make NY Safe, NEWSDAY (New
York), Aug. 7, 2005, at A29.
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not acting as a meaningful deterrent, the NYPD officers may be devoting an excessive amount of time to an effort that may ultimately be
fruitless. Rather than being stuck in the subways, these officers could
be assigned to more valuable law enforcement tasks that would result
in activities more likely to have an effect on crime control or other
law enforcement purposes. Thus, reallocation of police officers
could result in a better use of taxpayer money. Due to budgetary
constraints, the inefficient use of taxpayer funds is a major cause for
concern because it could conceivably preclude implementation of
better anti-terrorism measures.
V. POSSIBLE CHANGES
A. Changes Within the Search Policy
The goal of any modification to the NYPD’s random search policy should be to maximize security while minimizing inconvenience
and intrusion into the privacy of subway riders. With this goal in
mind, this Comment proposes potential changes that would address
some of the current policy’s weaknesses.
The first change is the elimination of advance notice at subway
stations that are conducting searches.247 This would remove the possibility that terrorists could avoid searches just by observing posted
notices. Although a small step, eliminating advance notice is a step in
the direction of making the search policy a more meaningful tool in
the fight against terrorism. A problem that this modification presents
is whether the search policy would remain constitutional after implementation. Although implementation of this change may weigh
on the side of unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,248 it is
unlikely to affect the constitutionality of the policy as a whole. This is
because the right to refuse consent still permits terrorists, and everyone else, to avoid being searched by turning around and leaving the
subway station.249
Another potential change is to conduct the searches on a much
larger scale at any given time. Currently, anyone who wants to avoid
being searched while still riding the subway can do so by simply finding an entrance where searches are not being conducted. By dramatically increasing the scale of the searches to extend to most, if not
all, subway stations at any given time, the road to circumventing the
247
248
249

See supra text accompanying note 45.
See supra text accompanying notes 219–223.
See supra text accompanying note 44.
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searches would be much narrower. This would cause the search policy to be a much more meaningful deterrent than it is now. However,
feasibility is an issue with implementing such a change due to the extremely high costs involved. William W. Millar, president of the
American Public Transportation Association, feels that conducting
searches on a comprehensive scale is virtually impossible, and he
states that “[i]f you were going to try to check a very high percentage
at every station or on every train, it would be incredibly labor250
intensive.”
A very controversial change, but nonetheless one that has its fair
share of supporters, is to allow some degree of racial profiling in the
search selection process. It is common knowledge, or at least commonly believed, that young Muslim men were responsible for both
the 9/11 attacks and the London bombings.251 The politically correct
approach is to agree with New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg in
declaring that it is impossible to predict what a terrorist looks like,
but not everyone agrees.252 If terrorists are most likely to be Muslim
men of Arab or South Asian descent, then it seems logical to take a
closer look at individuals who fit that description.253 Although critics
of racial profiling say it is prejudicial,254 if done properly, it is possible
that racial profiling would subject relatively few young men of Arab
or South Asian descent to searches.255 The key to proper racial profiling is to be as specific as possible with profile descriptions.256 A welldesigned system of racial profiling would also consider suspicious behavior, in addition to the traditional profile elements.257 Given the
sensitivity and controversy surrounding racial profiling, it would behoove police officers to profile politely and respectfully.258 Politicians
and government officials must be careful in how they advocate racial
250

Chan & Fahim, supra note 40, at A1.
Sperry, supra note 241, at A25.
252
Fred Lucas, The Right Way to Profile in NYC, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, Aug. 17,
2005, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=19163. In New
York, state assemblyman Dov Hikind, a Brooklyn Democrat, supports the use of racial
profiling for bag searches. Id.
253
See Sperry, supra note 241, at A25.
254
Id.
255
See id.
256
See id. Profile descriptions may include national origin, gender, and age,
among other characteristics. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Politically Incorrect Profiling: A Matter of Life or Death, 33 NAT'L J. 3406, 3406 (2001), available at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/members/buzz/2001/openingargument/110501.
htm.
257
Taylor, supra note 256, at 3406.
258
Id.
251
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profiling so as not to unnecessarily arouse animosity towards the government in targeted segments of the population. Since there is evidence that suggests many Arab-Americans would actually support ad259
ditional scrutiny of people with Middle Eastern features or accents,
the government can build upon this good will. Another way to offset
potential charges of prejudice is to search at least one person not of
Arab or South Asian descent for every person of Arab or South Asian
descent searched.260 Finally, it is important to remember that, despite
the potential utility of racial profiling, the advantage of profiling is
severely limited if terrorists respond by simply changing their “pro261
file.”
In fact, there are reports that Islamic terrorists have already
262
started to recruit Europeans to fool profilers.
Even if city officials agreed that racial profiling is desirable in
random bag searches, there are some serious obstacles to overcome
in implementing it. Obviously, law enforcement officials must be very
careful with racial profiling because of the potential for intentional
abuse and even innocent mistakes. For example, during July of 2005,
an innocent Brazilian man, who apparently looked Asian,263 was shot
and killed by British police who believed he was involved with the
London bombings.264 The potential for abuse and mistakes with racial profiling, however, should not cause city authorities to quickly
dismiss the idea. With the appropriate measures, abuse and human
error may be sufficiently minimized so that society would be willing to
accept the risks of racial profiling in exchange for the benefits. The
hard part is to develop and implement such measures. One possible
method for effectuating proper racial profiling is to train police officers to detect Muslim terrorists, not simply a Muslim person. This
would likely require coordinating the efforts of terrorism experts and
high-level federal or state officials to equip police officers with the
requisite knowledge to profile based on race. High-level officials
259

Id. The author cited a poll of 527 local Arab-Americans by the Detroit Free
Press, which revealed that sixty-one percent of Arab-Americans supported extra scrutiny of people with Middle Eastern features or accents. Id.
260
Id.
261
See Clarence Page, Editorial, Only Smart Profiling Makes Sense, BALT. SUN, Aug.
23, 2005, at 11A.
262
Id.
263
BBC News, I Saw Tube Man Shot—Eyewitness, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/
4706913.stm (last visited Nov. 4, 2006). An eyewitness was quoted as saying the man
was Asian. Id. It is possible that the police initially became suspicious of the victim
because they too believed he was Asian, or more specifically South Asian, which in
turn could have led to the belief that he looked like a terrorist. Id.
264
BBC News, Shot Man Not Connected to Bombing, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/4711021.stm (last visited Nov. 4, 2006).
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would share specific and credible intelligence that would describe in
detail the appearances of actual individuals suspected of being terrorists. Terrorism experts would train officers with respect to protocol
in certain situations—how to approach the suspect, how to maintain
public safety, etc. The challenges in implementing such a program
include cost and overcoming political unpopularity.
Another obstacle in implementing racial profiling is the issue of
doing so while retaining the constitutionality of the search policy.
With respect to the Fourth Amendment, the central requirement re265
mains reasonableness. In light of this standard, proper racial profiling as described above is likely to withstand constitutional challenges.
Racial profiling would further a compelling governmental interest
(deterring terrorist attacks in the New York City subway system)266
with a minimal invasion of privacy (individuals would be searched
only if their profiles closely matched specific and credible profiles of
known suspects).267 Considering the totality of the circumstances268—
we live with the constant and real threat of terrorism—proper racial
profiling seems reasonable. Furthermore, if searches and seizures
based on racial profiling are valid in the Fourth Amendment context,
then the fact that a given police officer is also subjectively motivated
by racial considerations by itself does not invalidate the search or seizure.269 Even if racial profiling is valid under the Fourth Amendment,
it must still withstand challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.270 Since racial profiling can be classified
as an explicitly racial policy, it is subject to strict scrutiny review by the
courts.271 Therefore, to pass constitutional challenge, the racial pro265

See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001).
See MacWade I, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *17–*18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
7, 2005); see supra text accompanying note 215.
267
See supra note 256 and accompanying text; see generally Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51
(1979)) (explaining three-pronged test that balances governmental interest, extent
to which seizure advances that interest, and individual privacy interest); supra note
140 and accompanying text.
268
See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002); supra note 88 and accompanying text.
269
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 n.2 (2000) (“The parties
properly agree that the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant
in determining whether that officer's actions violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
270
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
271
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must
be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
266
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filing policy must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.272
As discussed above, the governmental interest is clearly compelling. The question is whether the policy of racial profiling, as de273
scribed above, is narrowly tailored to further that interest. It seems
274
that a strong case could be made that it is. Assuming that it is possible, based on physical appearance, to categorize suspected terrorists
within a reasonably narrow range, the government would have in its
arsenal a very powerful weapon for fighting terrorism. The ability to
pinpoint terrorists with a reasonable degree of accuracy would allow
the government to focus its efforts and resources in a manner that
would significantly increase the likelihood of preventing and deterring terrorism. There does not seem to be another comparable alternative so easily available to the government. Given the potential
effectiveness of racial profiling and the ease with which racial profiling can be implemented, it is reasonable to consider at least the possibility that a wisely designed policy of racial profiling is a narrowly
tailored means to further the end of deterring terrorism.
A final proposal of modification to the current search policy is
expanding the search to cover the persons of passengers. This makes
sense because terrorists do not only carry explosives in bags and containers, but also attach bombs to their bodies. Consider the frequency of suicide bombings in the Middle East where the attackers
strap explosives to themselves, hiding them from public view with a
coat or baggy clothing. While this modification would probably enhance deterrence, it may very well be unconstitutional. Searching the
actual person takes the intrusion into privacy up a notch from looking at the contents of a bag.275 Passengers have higher subjective ex272

Id. (“[S]uch classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.”).
273
See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (explaining the
strict scrutiny test as one that “ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ [the] compelling
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification
was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype”).
274
See Taylor, supra note 256, at 3406
We have no good alternative [to racial profiling]. For the foreseeable future, the shortage of high-tech bomb-detection machines and
the long delays required to search luggage by hand will make it impossible to effectively screen more than a small percentage of . . . bags.
The only real protection is to make national origin a key factor in
choosing those bags.
275
See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). In FloresMontano, the Court explained that “highly intrusive searches of the person,” which
implicate the “dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched,” require a
higher level of suspicion than routine searches. Id. In holding that suspicionless
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276

pectations of privacy when it comes to searches of their persons.
Moreover, based on society’s reliance on subways as a quicker and
less-expensive commuting alternative to driving, an objective expecta277
tion of privacy exists as well.
While the justification for the intrusion—preventing and deterring terrorism—is entitled to serious
weight, the manner of conducting it—physically touching the person
and looking beyond what is observable on the surface—seems problematic.278 Furthermore, such searches would be more time consuming, resulting in greater inconvenience to subway passengers.
B. Changes to Supplement the Search Policy
Supplementing the random search policy with additional antiterrorism measures would probably be the most effective way to combat terrorism. Such measures include the use of explosives-detection
technology, the use of bomb-sniffing dogs, the use of video surveillance, and better intelligence gathering and analysis. Of course, all
of these additional measures must survive constitutional scrutiny.
Explosives-detection technology, such as detection of trace
amounts of chemicals commonly used in bombs,279 are actually less
invasive than hands-on bag checks and thus seem likely to be held
constitutional. Since this technology eliminates the need for patting
down the passenger,280 it is “no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or exploborder searches include the authority to disassemble and assemble a vehicle’s fuel
tank, the Court declined to apply any “complex balancing tests to determine”
whether a border search of a vehicle was “routine.” Id. Assuming that a border
search of a vehicle meets the threshold for a “routine” search, it seems the NYPD’s
random bag searches also constitute “routine” searches, given the similarities between the two types of searches (e.g., interest in public safety, generalized as opposed
to specific). See supra Parts III.B.2., III.C. (discussing governmental interests that justify suspicionless searches and undertaking constitutional analysis of NYPD’s search
policy, respectively).
276
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (characterizing a pat-down search as “a
serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity
and arouse strong resentment”).
277
See supra text accompanying note 77.
278
See supra text accompanying note 86.
279
Patrick McGeehan, Explosives Detector at Newark Airport Is Expected to Reduce PatDown Searches, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at B4. The Transportation Security Administration has already installed a new type of explosives-detection machine known as
trace portals at Newark Liberty International Airport. Id. The machine works by
blowing a series of puffs of air at each person who steps inside it. Id. The air forces
particles from the person onto the ground, where they are sucked into vents for
chemical analysis. Id. If chemicals used in explosives are detected, the machine signals an alarm. Id.
280
Id.
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281

sives.” If the technology is limited to the purpose of explosives detection and passengers are given the option of avoiding the technology by choosing not to ride the subway, then such technology appears
282
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The use of bomb-sniffing dogs has been considered by the Supreme Court of the United States and has been held to be constitutional due to the very limited nature of its invasion into personal privacy.283 In fact, because canine sniffs do not require any opening of
bags, do not expose any personal items that would otherwise have
remained hidden from public observation, and are necessarily limited to disclosing the presence or absence of contraband, the Supreme Court has held that they do not even constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment.284
Video surveillance, which would not differ substantially from the
type used for security in office buildings, should be constitutional.
Since the subway system is a public place, there is arguably no reasonable expectation of privacy.285 Indeed, “surveillance cameras have
become commonplace in airports, highway tollbooths, parking garages, stores, malls, banks, ATMs, the Statue of Liberty and at the
Golden Gate Bridge,”286 and are generally accepted by the public.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The implementation of the NYPD’s random search policy raises
the type of issue that will be at the forefront of legal debates and
courtroom litigation in the years to come. While the tools of legal
analysis will allow lawyers and judges to decide whether measures
such as the NYPD’s random search policy are constitutional, that determination is only the first step in fighting terrorism. To truly be
most effective in this new war of the modern age, members of the legal community, legislators, and politicians, along with ordinary citizens, will have to work together to battle an enemy that seeks to destroy the American way of life. The proposed changes discussed in
this Comment provide a starting point for collaborative effort. Because the enemy is elusive and able to adapt to anti-terror measures,
281

United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005); see supra text accompanying note 171.
282
See Marquez, 410 F.3d at 616; see supra text accompanying note 171.
283
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697–98 (1983).
284
Id. at 707.
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See Peter T. Kilborn, For Security, Tourists to Be on Other Side of Cameras, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002, at A12.
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the American people must not be narrow-minded in combating terrorism. A combination of measures—for example, random subway
searches, new explosives-detection technology, and increased video
surveillance—working in conjunction, will act as a better deterrence
and prevention system than any measure used alone. Additionally,
and somewhat paradoxically, considering the need for openmindedness, highly controversial measures such as racial profiling
may prove to be helpful in identifying and apprehending terrorists.
Of course, all of these measures must be balanced against the risk of
infringement upon individual liberties and rights, for if too much
freedom is sacrificed for the sake of national security, the terrorists
will have won anyway. Since this balance is so delicate, both prosecurity advocates and pro-civil liberties advocates need to remember
that each needs the other more than either may be willing to admit.

